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Commentary

Regulating Pornography:
Recent Legal Trends
By Alan Weinsteinw

Since the Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Young v.
American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427U.S. SO (1976), 28 ZD 329,
local governments have been permitted to single out adult
bookstores and theaters for special regulatory treatment. 1 In
the wake of Young, many municipalities enacted "por
nography zoning" ordinances based on the Detroit dispersion
model. Observing this trend in 1978, the HARVARD LAW
REVIEW noted that these municipalities were interpreting
Young as approving pornography zoning as constitutional
ly acceptable "in nearly all circumstances." 2 This interpreta
tion seemed incorrect, however, to the REvIEw's editors:
"Detroit's pornography zoning was found to satisfy three
established First Amendment criteria; future ordinances that
restrict the location of adult bookstores and theaters will like
ly be subject to these criteria as well." 3 A number of recent
lower court cases invalidating pornography zoning or
dinances indicate that the REVIEW's prediction was on target.
FIRST AMENDMENT TESTS UNDER YOUNG
Justice Stevens's plurality opinion in Young set out the First
Amendment criteria that the Detroit ordinance-and any
future ordinances-would have to satisfy. First, regulations
must be motivated not by distaste for the speech itself but by
a desire to eliminate its adverse effects. Mere hostility to con
stitutionally protected speech is an impermissible motive.
Second, even properly motivated legislation may be un
constitutional if its severely restricts First Amendment rights.
Third, even a properly motivated ordinance with only a
limited impact on free expression may be unconstitutional if
the municipality cannot demonstrate an adequate factual
basis for its conclusion that the ordinance will accomplish its
objective of eliminating the adverse effect of adult
businesses. 4 The cases that are discussed here, as well as the
better-known Schad case decided by the Supreme Court last
*Alan Weinstein is assistant professor of planning and business administra
tion at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and a practicing attorney.
Portions of this article were first prepared for the American Planning
Association Illinois/Wisconsin Conference, held in Chicago last September.
Randall Wondergem assisted with its preparation.
1. In Young, the Court upheld Detroit's "dispersion-type" zoning or
dinance, which prohibited adult bookstores and theaters from concentrating
near each other or near bars, pool halls, and other specified uses. Specifically,
the ordinance provided that an adult theater may not be located within 1,000
feet of any two other regulated uses. The "regulated uses" include-in ad
dition to adult bookstores-adult theaters and minitheaters, bars, cabarets,
hotels and motels, pawnshops, billiard and pool halls, public lodging houses,
secondhand stores, shoeshine parlors, and taxi dance halls. Detroit Ordinance
742-G (Nov. 2, 1972), amending Official Zoning Ordinance of the City of
Detroit §§32.007, 66.0000, 66.0101 (1962).

2. "Developments in the Law-Zoning," 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1557
(1978).
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summer, show that courts are not at all reluctant to invalidate
municipal ordinances that cannot meet these criteria (Schad
v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 49 U.S.L.W. 4597, 33 ZD
254).
In zoning cases, the traditional attitude of courts has been
to defer to local officials' assessments of the facts, but in por
nography zoning cases courts sensitive to the First Amend
ment issues at stake have adopted a far more stringent stan
dard of review. It is common in these cases for courts to in
sist upon a complete record of the evidence available to
municipal officials at the time they formulated the ordinance,
and some cases have shown judges to be sophisticated
analysts of planning issues.
DISPERSION APPROACHES
The recent invalidation of Atlanta's Adult Entertainment Or
dinance, in Purple Onion, Inc. v. Jackson, 511F.Supp.1207
(N.D. Georgia 1981), 34 ZD 7, illustrates both the stringen
cy and sophistication of recent court reviews. Atlanta's or
dinance, modeled on the Detroit ordinance upheld in Young,
was enacted in November 1976. Section 1 of the ordinance
set out the findings of fact and statements of purpose in
language quite similar to Detroit's. The city council found
that adult businesses blight and downgrade property values
and have an overall adverse effect on citizens' health and
welfare. Thus, the city council found it necessary that adult
businesses "be subject to special regulations in order to insure
that such uses and the effects thereof will not contribute to
the blighting of or the downgrading of the surrounding
neighborhood." 5
The method chosen to control adult businesses was disper
sion: certain defined adult businesses were subject to linear
restrictions on their location. No adult bookstore, adult
entertainment establishment, or adult theater could be
located within 1,000 feet of any other such use, or 500 feet
of the boundaries of any residential district or property used
for residential purposes, or 500 feet of any permanent struc
ture used as a church or place of religious worship. These
restrictions, while more stringent than Detroit's, were
generally in line with the Detroit scheme, but the Atlanta or
dinance also restricted all new adult businesses to three zon
ing districts and sought to amortize certain existing
businesses, both significant departures from the Detroit
ordinance.
Much of the testimony at trial dealt with the question of
whether or not there were available sites for adult businesses
in the three districts to which they were thus restricted: the
C-4 Central Business District and M-1 and M-2 industrial
districts. In Young, Justice Stevens had suggested that por
nography zoning is constitutional only so long as the "market
for this commodity is essentially unrestrained." 6 Thus, in the
Atlanta case the court was concerned whether the additional
locational restrictions of the ordinance were so severe that
they would significantly reduce, and possibly eliminate
altogether, public access to sexually oriented businesses. The
city contended that it was not required to make sure there
were sufficient available sites for these adult businesses in the
three zones, but it also contended that there were at least 81

3. Id.

5. 511 F.Supp. at 1210.

4. Id. at 1557-59.

6. 427 U.S. at 62.
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sites adequate for adult entertainment establishments. The
court refused to defer to the Atlanta officials' assessment of
the facts.
While not examining the 81 sites one by one, the court did
carefully review all the maps, documentary evidence,
photographs, and testimony regarding site availability. On
the basis of that review, the court found that all but 10 of the
81 sites were wholly unacceptable as sites for adult businesses;
of those 10 acceptable sites, no more than three or four would
be considered by a "reasonably prudent investor" as a possi
ble site for an adult business. 7 The court's review is notable for
its sophistication regarding land use.
The court first found that a few of the 81 sites were unac
ceptable because they violated one or more of the ordinance's
distance criteria. Many other sites were wholly unsuited for
retail or commercial use because the lot was too small or
because its shape precluded construction of a building of the
proper size. One site had an easement through the middle for
electric transmission wires. Several sites were 20 to 30 feet
below street level, making retail or commercial uses impossi
ble. At least one site was in a floodplain. In several instances,
the site was unsuitable because of nearby noxious uses: one
site was in the middle of a group of petroleum storage tanks;
another was contiguous to a city sewage treatment plant.
Going further, the court found that a large number of the
proposed sites were simply unavailable and would remain so
for the foreseeable future. Some of the proposed sites were
employee parking lots for large, permanent manufacturing
facilities. Other sites were occupied by buildings housing
substantial businesses. In a number of cases, the ownership
or use of the site made its sale to the operator of an adult
business highly unlikely: one landowner was the city of
Atlanta; another was the Southern Railway, and the court
felt that it was unlikely to sell or lease any of its railroad right
of-way for an adult business.
At the time of trial, the court found that there were 42 or
43 sexually oriented businesses in Atlanta and 12 or 13 that
offered live entertainment. All of the live establishme:rats ex
cept one would be affected by the amortization provision and
would be permitted to relocate in only one of the three zon
ing districts. The other adult businesses presently in zones
other than the permitted zones would become nonconform
ing uses under the ordinance and would face a ban on enlarg
ing, extending, or reconstructing their businesses. Thus, nor
mal attrition would slowly reduce the number of adult
bookstores and theaters in districts other than C-4, M-1, and
M-2. On the basis of these facts, the court concluded that
allowing the ordinance to stand would reduce public access
in Atlanta to both live, sexually oriented entertainment and
to movies, books, and paraphernalia characterized by an em
phasis on sex.
Although the court's finding of restricted access was, by
itself, enough to invalidate the ordinance-it clearly violated
Justice Stevens's second criterion-the Atlanta scheme suf
fered from many other faults. The court found the definitions
of adult businesses to be substantially overbroad. The or
dinance defined "adult bookstore" so loosely that, in the view
of the court, the definition would include the federal court
house and numerous private dwellings. The definition of an
7. In making these findings, the court did not consider either the price of
the land or whether the land was presently for sale.

adult theater could easily be read to include downtown hotels
that offered "adult movies'' on cable television in guests'
rooms.
The court was also strongly influenced by evidence of an
improper motive in enacting the ordinance. Minutes of a
meeting of the zoning review board revealed that, in addition
to the ordinance's stated purposes, another purpose was
discussed: that it would help those citizens disgusted by the
conduct of these businesses to ''zone them out of business."
At that same meeting, an assistant city attorney indicated that
the adult zoning ordinance was the "strongest vehicle toward
elimination" of adult businesses and the city was "hoping for
complete eradication" of adult businesses. The city attorney
also stated that the effect of the ordinance would be to reduce
the number of these establishments.
Taken together, the evidence of an improper motive, the
overbroad definitions, and most critically, the fact that the
ordinance would immediately reduce or eliminate public ac
cess to live, sexually oriented entertainment and would
gradually reduce the availability of erotic books and movies
led the court to declare the ordinance void for violation of
the First Amendment. Atlanta is appealing the district court's
ruling, but, at present, the city is discussing new legislation
that would either copy the Detroit ordinance more closely or
use the regulation of alcoholic beverages as a means of
regulating adult entertainment. 8
The Atlanta case is not unique. A general pattern is emerg
ing in which courts strike down pornography zoning or
dinances that violate one or more of the criteria announced
in Young. In CLR Corp. v. Henline, 520 F.Supp. 760 (W.D.
Michigan 1981), 34 ZD 59, a federal district court invalidated
a pornography zoning ordinance from Wyoming, Michigan,
a city of 62,000 adjacent to Grand Rapids. The ordinance,
although modeled on the Detroit scheme, had the effect of en
suring that no more than two to four adult establishments
could locate in the city, with all the potential sites being
located on 2,500 feet of frontage on one road near the western
edge of the city. The court also found that the city had failed
to provide any legislative history or factual background sup
porting the need for the ordinance. The city contended that
it was unnecessary for it to have a separate legislative history
when the experience of Detroit and other cities regarding
these ordinances has been so thoroughly documented. The
city also sought to apply the distance restrictions of the or
dinance in cases where no Wyoming residents were close
enough to a potential site to prohibit the location but residents
of Grand Rapids were-apparently the first time that distance
requirements under the Wyoming zoning ordinance had ever
been measured outside of the city's territorial limits. The
court ultimately found the ordinance void under the third
standard in Young because of the complete failure of the
city to assert any state interest to justify the ordinance.
LICENSING AND SPECIAL USE APPROACHES
Perhaps the best example of special use and licensing pro
cedures operating as prior restraints on free speech is Enter
tainment Concepts, Inc. v. Maciejewski, 631F.2d497 (1980),
33 ZD 129. There, the village of Westmont, a Chicago
suburb, amended its zoning ordinance to create a new special
use category-adult movies, indoor theaters-and passed a
8. See N. Y. State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca, 69 L.Ed.2d 357 (1981).
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license revocation ordinance that prohibited the exhibition
of "obscene" motion pictures. The facts surrounding this
legislation are quite illuminating. The plaintiff operated the
only movie theater in Westmont. On September 21, 1979, he
began advertising "Coming Soon, Adult Movies" on the
theater marquee and scheduled the movie Beneath the Valley
of the Ultra-Vixens to open on November 9. On October 1,
the village passed its special use amendment, which was
nothing more than a one-line addition to the list of per
mitted and special uses in the zoning ordinance.
The court found numerous defects in the two village or
dinances. First, the special use ordinance contained no defini
tion of the term "adult movies"; thus the plaintiff did not
know whether he had to apply for a special use permit even
if he showed only one X-rated or R-rated film. The ordinance
also was found to have as its "operative distinction" the con
tent of the movie shown, did not advance any legitimate
governmental interest to support the zoning amendment, and
gave unbridled discretion to village officials to grant or deny
a special use permit. In short, the special use ordinance could
satisfy none of the criteria in the Stevens opinion.
The second Westmont ordinance provided for the revoca
tion or suspension of a movie theater's license upon a finding
of obscenity by the village's movie review board and the
mayor. The movie review board consisted of three Westmont
residents who would review motion pictures publicly ex
hibited in the village "to determine whether or not they are
obscene." If a majority of the board found a movie obscene,
they would report their finding to the mayor. The mayor
would then conduct an "adversary-type hearing" where the
movie exhibitor could contest the board's findings. If the
movie were found obscene after this hearing, the ordinance
provided for a 90-day license suspension for a first offense
and permanent license revocation for a second offense. The
court found this portion of the ordinance wholly without
merit. Noting that a municipality "is not free to adopt
whatever procedures it pleases for dealing with obscenity
... without regard to the possible consequences for constitu
tionally protected speech," the court held the licensing or
dinance insufficient in failing to provide adequate procedural
protections of speech and in providing the penalty of suspen
sion or revocation.
Special Use Permits
County of Cook v. World Wide News Agency, 424 N.E.2d
1173 (Ill. App. 1981), 34ZD10, is one of the latest in a line
of cases in which courts have found that special use pro
cedures applying only to adult businesses are invalid prior
restraints on freedom of expression. In World Wide News
Agency, an amendment to the Cook County zoning or
dinance limited adult bookstores, adult theaters, and adult
minitheaters to areas zoned C-3 and made these adult
businesses special uses that required the issuance of a special
use permit. The ordinance also contained a distance provi
sion: adult businesses could not locate within 1,000 feet of an
area zoned for residential use, although this prohibition could
be waived if the applicant obtained the approval of 60 per
cent of the neighbors within 1,000 feet of the proposed use.
The combination of the distance provision with the restric
tion of adult businesses to areas zoned C-3 meant that most
locations for adult businesses would have to comply with
both the special use and the 60 percent approval
6
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requirements. 9 The Illinois Appellate Court held that these
restrictions were an impermissible prior restraint on speech.
The court was very concerned with the discretion granted to
the county board through the special use provision and the
"veto" that neighbors would have over most locations zoned
to allow adult businesses.
Business-Licensing Requirements
Two cases from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals il
lustrate the bounds of constitutionality when adult businesses
are subject to licensing requirements. Genusa v. City of
Peoria, 619 F.2d 1203 (1980), involved a Detroit-type or
dinance that also included licensing, inspection, and
employee permit requirements. The court upheld the distance
provision in the ordinance and also found that both the re
quirement of a license and the $100 license fee were
reasonable adjuncts to the zoning scheme; i.e., it was a way
to keep track of adult uses and assure that they complied with
the zoning ordinance. But the court struck down the or
dinance's requirement that adult businesses undergo a special
inspection to ascertain whether they were in compliance with
all provisions of the Peoria city code.
The problem here, in the court's view, was that only adult
businesses faced the special inspection requirement. To the
court, this was an impermissible prior restraint on speech that
had as its operative distinction the content of the books or
movies that were sold or exhibited on the premises. The court
denied that the city could have any legitimate governmental
interest in making a special inspection of bookstores with one
type of books, while bookstores with other types of books
would not be inspected. For similar reasons, the court also
invalidated a portion of the ordinance that ordered the police
department to conduct a special investigation of applicants
for adult business licenses and another that required
employees of adult businesses to obtain an employee per
mit. 10
By contrast, Chulchian v. City of Indianapolis, 633 F.2d
27 (1980), involved the validity of a general business licens
ing ordinance. Chulchian, the operator of an Indianapolis
theater that showed sexually explicit films, was denied his an
nual business license on the grounds that there had been
numerous arrests on the premises for "illegal, immoral, or
obscene conduct" and that neighboring residents considered
the theater "to create a nuisance." Chulchian charged that the
licensing ordinance, by authorizing the closing of his theater
9. A county official testified that there were approximately 40 to 45 C-3
zones in unincorporated Cook County. All but three of these zones were
within 1,000 feet of an area zoned residential.
10. See also Wortham v. City of Tucson, 624 P.2d 334 (Ariz. App. 1981)
(licensing ordinance impinging on First Amendment rights that gives the li
censing authority broad discretion to refuse a permit is unconstitutional prior
re~traint of those rights); Wendlingv. City of Duluth, 495 F.Supp. 1380 (D.C.
Minnesota 1980), 33 ZD 160 (imposition of $500 annual fee on adult
business~s is an unlawful prior restraint, and provisions of general licens
ing reqmrements as applied to adult bookstores were unconstitutional for
lack of necessary procedural safeguards); Doe v. City of Buffalo, 432
N ·:'·S.2d 982 (1980) (unbridled authority of licensing authorities with respect
to issuance of license was unconstitutional infringement of First Amendment
fr~edom). The Supreme Court recently upheld a licensing scheme from
Minot, North Dakota, that imposed a $300-per-device license fee on amuse
ment "devices," but the case had not been reported prior to publication. See
Min.at v. Central Ave. News, Inc .. 308 N.W.2d 851(N.D.1981), for the rul
ing in the court below.
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if he permitted illegal conduct on the premises, was an im
permissible restraint on constitutionally protected speech.
The court disagreed, arguing that the ordinance, although
it covered theaters, did not regulate them on the basis of con
tent; the ordinance applied to all businesses in Indianapolis.
Further, the ordinance required that a licensee know that his
conduct was illegal. Although the city of Indianapolis
acknowledged that it bore the burden to prove such illegal
knowledge, the city also indicated that it would not deny a
license because of an isolated incident and conceded that it
could not use obscenity convictions to justify the denial of
a license.
The court felt that under these circumstances the discretion
granted under the ordinance was not boundless and held the
ordinance to be constitutional. In the view of the court, the
ordinance furthered a legitimate and substantial governmen
tal interest that was unrelated to the suppression of free
speech. Chulchian was denied his license for reasons wholly
unrelated to speech; the ordinance did nothing more than
hold the operator of a business responsible for conduct on the
premises of which he had knowledge. Although Chulchian's
theater had been denied a license because it had been found
to be a nuisance, it was not a nuisance because it exhibited
sexually explicit films. Rather, it was a nuisance because there
had been a pattern of arrests for illegal activities associated
with its operation as a theater.

REGULA TING TOPLESS DANCING AND
MASSAGE PARLORS
The stringency of court review of pornography zoning is at
tributable to the courts' perceived need to safeguard forms
of expression protected by the First Amendment where there
is widespread distaste for the form of expression itself. When
these First Amendment concerns are either absent or are
superseded by other constitutional concerns, the outcomes
of court reviews are substantially different. Thus, when
courts review ordinances that govern massage parlors or
regulate live entertainment in establishments serving liquor,
the analysis presented above is inappropriate. Massage
parlors, while adult businesses, do not have First Amendment
protection. Nude dancing is arguably "speech"; the act of
bodily massage is definitely not. And, even though it is a pro
tected form of expression, nude dancing and other sexually
oriented live entertainment may be regulated in
establishments serving liquor under the broad powers granted
to the states by the Twenty-first Amendment (Repeal of
Prohibition).
Liquor Licensing Approaches
The Supreme Court has long recognized that a state has ab
solute power under the Twenty-first Amendment to prohibit
totally the sale of liquor within its borders. It is equally well
established that a state has broad power under the amend
ment to regulate the times, places, and circumstances under
which liquor may be sold. Ten years ago, in California v.
LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972), the Court upheld a state's right
to prohibit nude dancing in bars under a statute prohibiting
acts of "gross sexuality" in establishments serving alcohol.
Although agreeing that nude dancing had a certain protected
status under the First Amendment, the Court stressed that the
added presumption in favor of the validity of state regulation
that the Twenty-first Amendment confers required that the

regulation be upheld so long as it was not an irrational exer
cise of the police power.
The Court faced the issue again this past summer in New
York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca, 69 L.Ed.2d 357
(1981). In 1977, the New York State legislature enacted
legislation banning topless dancing in bars. The legislation
was immediately challenged. In 1980, the New York Court
of Appeals ruled that the law amounted to censorship of a
constitutionally protected means of expression and that the
state had failed to show a governmental interest sufficient to
justify the restriction on free expression. The Supreme Court,
without hearing argument in the case, reversed the decision.
The Court agreed that topless dancing has a certain protected
status, but, when liquor regulation is involved, the balance
tips in favor of the state. In the Court's view, the law was a
rational exercise of the police power based on the legislature's
finding that any form of nudity coupled with alcohol in public
places results in undesirable behavior and that such behavior
can best be prevented by prohibiting nudity in establishments
serving liquor.
On remand from the Supreme Court, the New York Court
of Appeals last November held that the guarantee of freedom
of expression in the New York State constitution served to
invalidate the ban on topless dancing independently of
the U.S. Constitution and again declared the legislation
unconstitutional.
In its first opinion in the case, Bellanca v. New York State
Liquor Authority, SO N.Y.2d 524 (1980), the court of appeals
had not found it necessary to consider the New York State
constitution, holding that the statute was invalid under the
U.S. Constitution. On remand, the majority based its holding
on two arguments: first, that there were no legislative findings
to support the state's exercise of its authority to ban topless
dancing; and second, that, since the New York State constitu
tion contains no provision similar to the Twenty-first
Amendment, the state constitution's guarantee of free expres
sion is "undiminished" by other policy considerations and
thus serves to prohibit the legislature's ban on topless danc
ing even when the federal Constitution would not. 11
11. The majority opinion, however, is far from satisfying. The majori
ty's first argument-the absence of legislative findings-hinges on interpreta
tion of a "Legislative Support Memorandum" that accompanies the topless
dancing statute. In the view of the majority, this document is nothing more
than "the memorandum of the assemblyman who introduced the bill" and,
"[a)lthough his memorandum might perhaps be classified as part of the
legislative history, ... there is nothing to suggest that it was adopted by the
legislature or otherwise converted into legislative findings .... " But it was
this same memorandum that was quoted with approval by the U.S. Supreme
Court in support of its view that, even if explicit legislative findings were
required to uphold the ban on topless dancing, they exist in this case. Fur
ther, Justice Garbrielli's dissent in Bellanca on remand notes that the
memorandum is reprinted in the 1977 NEw YoRK STATE LEGISLATIVE AN
NUAL, which "provides contemporaneous documentation of legislative in
tent." Thus, the majority's argument regarding the lack of legislative findings
seems strained in the absence of any indication that the legislature was
unaware of its own member's memorandum.
The majority's second argument-focusing on the role of the Twenty-first
Amendment-is equally strained. The majority argues that because the state
constitution contains no equivalent to the Twenty-first Amendment, there
is no countervailing constitutional reason to curtail the right to free expres
sion. But, as Justice Jasen notes in his dissent, 'The broad sweep of the
Twenty-first Amendment has been recognized as conferring something more
than the normal state authority over public health, welfare, and morals,"
California v. LaRue. 409 U.S. 109, 114 (1972). In short, a state constitution
need not contain an equivalent to the Twenty-first Amendment for the force
of that amendment to have an effect on judging the constitutionality of state
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Persons familiar with the cabaret business in New York
have argued that the case will have little impact.
Establishments that have been "using sex to sell liquor" are
likely to switch from topless dancing to "wet T-shirt contests"
or put "pasties" on their dancers. Establishments that are
primarily purveyors of sexually oriented entertainment, on
the other hand, have the option of becoming "juice bars."
They would then be safely outside the state's regulatory
authority.

ZONING APPROACHES
Massage parlors are treated quite differently from adult
bookstores and theaters not only because their activities are
not protected by the First Amendment but also because there
is a strong historical link between prostitution and commer
cial establishments that offer body massage by members of
the opposite sex. 12 The most recent development in the regula
tion of massage parlors has been the use of county zoning or
dinances to control these uses.
Two recent Texas cases illustrate the trend: Stansberry v.
Holmes, 613 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1980), 32 ZD 212, and
Harper v. Lindsay, 616 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1980). Noting that
massage parlors had moved outside city limits to escape
regulation, the Texas legislature enacted enabling legislation
that empowered counties to adopt regulations governing the
operation and location of massage parlors and similar
establishments. Harris County (suburban Houston) subse
quently adopted regulations that restricted the location of
massage parlors by requiring owners to show that their
businesses were at least 1,500 feet from certain other uses, in
cluding schools, dwellings, and buildings serving alcohol.
In reviewing the subsequent challenges to the ordinance,
the court emphasized that its analysis of the regulations was
guided only by the traditional standards applicable to zon
ing regulations. So long as the ordinance was not "arbitrary
and capricious, having no relation to the general welfare,"
it would be upheld. The court then found these regulations
"a rational and understandable effort to deal with a perceived
evil that affected living conditions in the area," with no
discussion of the effects on the businesses as would be re
quired were First Amendment rights at issue.
actions that regulate any aspect of the sale of alcoholic beverages. The ma
jority declined to accept this position, holding that the ban on topless danc
ing must be justified solely on the basis of the general police power and find
ing that, under the police power, the ban on topless dancing constituted
an impermissible restriction on freedom of expression. However, the ma
jority's finding on this issue is unsupported by the citation of any authority
and seems mistaken in view of the authority that Justice Jasen cites for his
position that under the "more than normal" police power conferred by the
Twenty-first Amendment, the minimal restriction on free expression of a ban
on topless dancing must give way to the critical state interest in regulating
the sale of alcoholic beverages.
However strained the majority opinion may be, it now stands as law in
New York until the legislature chooses to act. Given the majority's holding,
a new legislative enactment that bars topless dancing in establishments
serving liquor, so long as it is accompanied by an explicit statement of
legislative findings, should be upheld.
12. Most land use ordinances that regulate massage parlors, which are
usually termed Adult Physical Culture Establishments in the ordinance,
define these uses partly by focusing on contact between members of the op
posite sex. This is done mainly to avoid characterizing health spas and similar
establishments as massage parlors, but New York City officials report a more
intriguing reason. Homosexual massage parlors in New York are operated
so discreetly that they rarely intrude on neighborhood sensibilities enough
to become an issue.

8
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GUIDELINES FOR ORDINANCE DRAFTING
Taken as a whole, the most recent pornography zoning cases
involving restrictions on adult businesses with First Amend
ment protection-such as theaters and bookstores-show a
clear pattern of strong judicial concern with maintaining com
munity access to such businesses. In determining the constitu
tionality of municipal adult-use ordinances, courts have
generally looked to Justice Stevens's opinion in Young for
guidance but have also considered Justice Powell's concur
ring opinion in Young and the majority and concurring opin
ions in the recent Schad case. The courts now appear to be
guided by the following general rules.
First, an ordinance whose effect is to severely restrict the
locations available to accommodate adult businesses
whether present or anticipated-will be struck down. Loca
tional restrictions on adult businesses are permissible only if
the "market for this commodity is essentially unrestrained."
Thus, at minimum, ordinances should not operate to reduce
the total number of existing adult businesses in a communi
ty or preclude the normal operations of the market in pro
viding new businesses as demand warrants. Further, the
presence of adult businesses in neighboring communities to
which residents have ''reasonable access" will not leave a
community free to eliminate such businesses within its own
borders.
Second, ordinances whose wording is vague, especially
where the definitions in the ordinance make it unclear what
is and what is not regulated, will be struck down. A vaguely
worded ordinance leaves the business operator uncertain as
to whether or not his activities come within the ordinance's
prohibitions and thus functions as a prior restraint on
freedom of expression.
Third, ordinances that do not develop a factual basis for
their restrictions on adult businesses or which do not relate
their restrictions directly to recognized zoning purposes will
be struck down. Pornography zoning is permitted to have a
limited impact on free expression only because it serves other
legitimate governmental interests, such as the preservation
of neighborhoods. To guard against regulations that are
motivated by a distaste for constitutionally protected speech
itself, communities must demonstrate the adverse effects
associated with the places where the expression occurs and
narrowly tailor their restrictions to further the specific
governmental interests endangered by the presence of adult
businesses.
Fourth, and last, ordinances that grant government of
ficials broad, unbridled discretionary powers to determine
whether or not an adult business will be permitted to
operate-such as special use permits and licensing
provisions-will be struck down. The courts will permit of
ficials discretionary power to close or prohibit an adult
business only where their authority stems from an ordinance
not directed solely at adult uses and where there are both
strict limits on administrative discretion and procedures that
safeguard First Amendment rights.
TRENDS
As a final comment, a recent article in the New York Times
Magazine 13 suggests that adult businesses-and, therefore,
13. Tony Schwartz, "The TV Pornography Boom," September 13, 1981,
at 44.

Commentary
the furor surrounding their regulation-may be approaching
a rapid decline. The article notes the following: installations
of cable television and sales of videorecorders are increasing
rapidly; 25 to 50 percent of all prerecorded videocassettes sold
are X-rated; when X-rated movies are offered as a separate
feature on cable, the percentage of viewers regularly exceeds
50 percent and goes as high as 95 percent.
Al Goldstein, publisher of SCREW magazine and a pioneer
in the adult entertainment business, says in the article: ''I'd
hate at this moment to be the owner of a porno theater. Their
obsolence is inevitable. Some people say I'm a doomsayer,
but I think the technology speaks. X-rated films should never
have been seen in theaters anyway. It's O.K. to see a horror
film in a theater, but the point of a porno film is to turn you
on, and a theater isn't the best place for that. The ideal con
text is the home."

Planners and the
Unauthorized Practice of
Law: A Lawyer's Response
By Philip J. Tierney*
The recent commentary by Stuart Meck entitled "Some
Thoughts on City Planners and the Unauthorized Practice of
Law" (33 LUL!ZD No. 10 at 6) contains valid criticisms of
the legal community's sometimes overly protective view of
what constitutes the practice of law. However, the article also
contains some disturbing remarks about the lawyer's role in
the administrative process. Meck contends that lawyers need
not be exclusively entitled to represent clients before plan
ning commissions and zoning boards. He observes that while:
[i]t is true that in complex administrative proceedings legal
training and the knowledge of an attorney would definitely be
necessary, . . that is not the case here. Boards of zoning ap
peals are composed of lay persons with no special legal train
ing and often no special training at all. Despite the judicial aura
. . . conferred upon them, boards are not courts of law. This
is not to say that boards should not be subject to reform; in
deed, there have been many such proposals. Rather, their pro
cedures are not difficult for a lay representative to grasp, and
no license to practice law is required to comprehend them."

It is important to define what we mean by administrative
proceedings. In this context, I take the term to mean those
proceedings before planning commissions or zoning boards
where evidence is presented to meet certain legal burdens of
*Philip J. Tierney is an attorney and chief hearing examiner for Mont
gomery County, Maryland.

proof or persuasion and the applicant seeks to obtain a
favorable ruling from the commission or board. I do not take
the term to include those preliminary steps that may precede
a formal administrative proceeding.
Despite the lay character and informality of administrative
proceedings, lawyers perform an indispensable function for
clients just by being there. They are there to protect the legal
rights of a client. The abuse or denial of these legal rights may
occur at unpredictable moments and in the most unlikely
situations.
An administrative proceeding, even at the simplest level,
involves basic due process rights. Adequate notice and a fair
hearing are essential. Many states require opportunity for
cross-examination. Knowledge of past administrative deci
sions and agency adherence to them is critical. Conclusions
of witnesses should be based upon well-reasoned testimony.
Extraneous or irrelevant evidence should be excluded from
the record. The board or commission should conclude the
proceeding with written findings of fact and conclusions of
law that are based upon evidence of record. A client's
representative should be able to recognize these rights and
assert them to the fullest benefit of the client. Lawyers are
uniquely qualified to identify and enforce these rights.
Indeed, lawyers alone possess skills that enable the client to
take full advantage of these rights.
A lawyer is not simply a defensive player. He or she is
trained to arrange the presentation of evidence in the light
most favorable to the client. The lawyer can neutralize or
diminish opposition to the client's cause. A lawyer's involve
ment can make the difference in a close case and provides a
valuable insurance policy in not so close cases.
Notwithstanding the benefits of having a lawyer as a
representative in an administrative proceeding, they have on
occasion represented their clients poorly. In such an event the
client has recourse through a malpractice claim or under the
strict professional disciplinary codes. An ample body of law
protects clients from errant lawyers. This is not the case when
the client's errant representative is a nonlawyer.
Many states have already spoken on the issue of nonlawyer
representation in administrative proceedings and have re
jected the practice. Last year the Maryland attorney general
ruled that nonlawyers should not act in a representational
capacity in an administrative proceeding (Op. Atty. Gen .
Md. 80-637). Despite Meck's skepticism, these rulings are not
intended to protect lawyers from competition; rather, they
are intended to protect clients from those unqualified to act
in a representational capacity.
Legal problems come up in unexpected ways, and lawyers
are trained to recognize and handle them. Anything less than
representation by counsel only shortchanges the person be
ing represented. Lawyers carry a heavy responsibility in their
representational capacity. It is not clear from Meck's article
why any sensible nonlawyer would want to assume that
burden.
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